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Abstract
This paper discussed the encounter of Indonesian Muslims toward the
idea of secularism. Secularism since its rise in Europe in the 18th century has
spread all over the world. Supporters of secularism have assumed that secularism
is undeniable. People eventually will hold it and apply it in their life, including in
the public space. However, in the context of the relationship between Islam
and state in Indonesia, secularism thesis has been proven failed. During the
Indonesian history, the relationship between Islam and state has been a hot
discourse even until recently. Yet, this paper concluded that one thing is clear;
Indonesian people, especially Indonesian Muslims, have rejected secularism. In
the meantime, some have rejected theocratic state either. Muslims then have
endlessly endeavored to reformulate a viable synthesis on the relationship
between Islam and state in Indonesia. What Indonesia has now is among the
efforts of  Indonesian Muslims to have a better formulation on how Islam
plays its role in the public space, including in the political sphere.
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Introduction: General Framework
G
enerally speaking, there are two different intellectual discourses
in contemporary Islamic political thinking about Islam and the
state. While both recognize the importance of Islamic principles
in all spheres of life, their interpretation to modern situation and
their applicability in the real world are different. On one hand, some
argue that Islam should be the basis of the state; that shari’a ought to
be adopted as the state constitution; that political sovereignty rests
in the hand of the Divine; that the idea of the modern nation state is
contradictory to the concept of umma (Islamic community), which
recognizes no political boundary; and while recognizing the principle
of shura (consultation), its realization is different from the
contemporary notion of democracy. In other words, according to
this perspective, the modern political system contradicts to Islamic
teachings.3
On the other hand, others argue that Islam does not lay down
any clear form of state theory (or political theory) that must be
followed by the umma. Islam as a religion has not specified a particular
system of government for Muslims, because, according to this view,
there will be always changes and development of situation in this
world that makes Islam should be suitable for all times and places.
Therefore, the form of government, among others, is decided based
on the rational human mind and to be shaped according to the public
interest, yet still within the framework of Islamic general precepts.4
Furthermore, the term “state” (dawla) in fact cannot be found in the
Qur’an.5 Nonetheless, it is important to note that this position
recognizes the fact that the Qur’an does contain ethical values and
injunction on human socio-political activities that include the
principles of “justice, equality, brotherhood, and freedom.” For them,
therefore, as long as the state adheres to such principles, it conforms
to Islamic teachings.6
3 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 2003), p. 6.  The proponents of this view, among others are Rashid Ridha,
Sayyid Qutb and Abu A’la al-Mawdudi.
4 Ibid. p. 7.
5 Qamaruddin Khan, Political Concepts in the Qur’an, (Lahore: Islamic Book Foundation,
1982), p. 3.
6 Bahtiar Effendy, op.cit., p. 7.
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Based on the above exploration, the first Islamic theoretical
model reflects the tendency to emphasize the legal and formal aspect
of Islamic political idealism. On the other hand, the second model
stresses substance rather than the formal and legal aspect of the state.
The second model that has substantialist character, that is
emphasizing values such as justice, equality, consultation, and
participation that do not contradict Islamic principles, thus has the
potential to serve as a viable approach to relate Islam with modern
politics in which the nation state is its major component.7
Within this general precept, I would like to discuss how Islam
and the state in Indonesia encounter each other in formulating the
form of government, especially before the 1998 reformation. I will
also explore it in the new understanding of the relationship between
religion and politics in the light of theory of secularization. However,
my paper will not elaborate all elements of society, nor does it provide
historical details of Islam encounters with modern Indonesian society.
Historical facts will be surveyed to give a glimpse overview, although
it remains importance to discuss it as an entirely process of the
encounter.
Islam and the State in Indonesia: Historical Survey
The discourse of the formal role of Islam in the state has been
one of the most divisive issues in Indonesia’s political and
constitutional history.8 The debate, in particular, is about the question
of whether to recognize the Islamic shari’a in the constitution. Much
of this debate usually begins with the so-called Jakarta Charter, an
agreement made between Muslim and nationalist leaders on June
22, 1945 as part of the preparations for Indonesia’s independence.
The most controversial part of the charter was a seven-word clause
“dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-
pemeluknya” (with the obligation to practice Islamic law for adherents
of Islam). There are two different legal interpretation and implications
of the clause. The minimalist interpretation is that the obligation to
7 Ibid. Advocates of this view include Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Fazlur Rahman
and Qamaruddin Khan.
8 Greg Fealy, “Divided Majority: Limits of Indonesian Political System”, in Islam
and Political Legitimacy, edited by Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (London and
New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 155.
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follow Islamic law lay with individual Muslims, not to the state. The
maximalist position states that the state must ensure adherence to
the shari’a and that the charter would provide the constitutional basis
for extensive legislation giving effect to Islamic law.9
In the beginning of the formation of Indonesian state, the seven
members of committee charged with finalizing the constitution
initially agreed to the Jakarta Charter’s inclusion as the preamble,
but at a meeting on August 18, 1945, the day after the independence
was proclaimed, pro-charter Muslim leaders came under strong
pressure from “secular” Muslims, nationalists and religious minorities
to drop the seven words. Seven members of the committee were
Abikusno Tjokrosuyoso, A. Kahar Muzakkar, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo,
A. Wachid Hasjim, Soekarno10, Muhammad Hatta11, Achmad
Subardjo, Muhammad Yamin and A.A. Maramis. The first four were
Muslims who committed to the inclusion of Islam into the
constitution. The second four were Muslims who favor secular state.
The ninth was a Christian. The main argument from the nationalist
faction was that the predominantly non-Muslim regions in eastern
part of Indonesia might break away from the republic if an Islamically
inclined state was declared. Finally, Muslim leaders agreed to exclude
the charter in the interests of national unity. They also dropped the
clause that requires the president to be Muslim. However, the
exclusion of the charter emerges a bitter reaction from many sections
of the Islamic community. They felt that the charter’s opponents
had been alarmist and that Muslims had been forced into making
greater sacrifices in establishing the new state than had non-Muslims.
Instead, some people say that this is the greatest gift from Muslims
to Indonesia. In turn, Islamic political leaders expected that they
would later win large majorities in the parliament and Constituent
Assembly and could implement the shari’a through legislation and
constitutional amendments.12
The discourse about the Jakarta Charter re-emerged as a
polarizing issue in the late 1950s. The Constituent Assembly as the
9 Ibid.
10 He was appointed as the first president of Indonesia. He served the office from
1945-1966.
11 He was appointed as the first vice president, but he then resigned in 1957 as a
result of political dispute with Sukarno.
12 Bahtiar Effendy, op.cit, pp. 32-3.
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result of the 1955 General Election, which began drafting a new
constitution in 1956, became deadlocked in early 1959 over the issue
of whether or not the charter should form the preamble. The result
of election was that Islamic group controlled 114 out of 257 seats
(43.5 per cent of the votes) in the parliament, which did not make
them as an absolute majority faction13. Nationalists and non-Muslim
parties, with the backing of President Sukarno and increasingly
influential army leadership, opposed the charter’s inclusion.
Muslim parties strived to include it by a series of votes in May
and June 1959 but fell short of the necessary two-thirds majority.
Given this situation, on July 5, 1959, President Sukarno dissolved
the assembly and decreed the return of Indonesia’s founding 1945
Constitution without the charter. The only concession to Muslim
interest was the insertion of an imprecise clause stating that the
charter “gave soul” (menjiwai) and “connecting totality” (rangkaian-
kesatuan) to the constitution. Yet, the word shari’ah was not mentioned
in the body of the constitution and the vague acknowledgement of
the charter carried no legal force.14 The charter was effectively buried
as a serious political issue for the next forty years. Sukarno
discouraged further debate on that issue and the New Order (1966-
1998) under President Suharto stigmatized efforts to implement
shari’a contrary to Pancasila and inimical to national stability.15
Some Considerations on the Failure of Political Islam
Muslim political leaders of the 1950s and 1960s, when viewing
the multiple failures of Islamic parties, were given to regretting that
Indonesia’s umma as a majority with a minority mentality. The
assumption that Indonesians who shared the same Islamic faith also
had the same political views was incorrect. Indeed, the ideal of a
politically united umma has been often invoked in Indonesian Islam,
but seldom realized. The starting, and perhaps the main, point to
understanding why Islam has not enjoyed greater power as an
autonomous legitimating force lies in an examination of the internal
13 The complete result of the 1955 General Election can be seen in Zachary Abuza,
Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia, (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 16.
14 Bahtiar Effendy, op.cit., p. 33.
15 Greg Fealy, op.cit., p. 156.
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disagreements and rivalries within the umma for much of the past
century.16
According to the 1990 census, 87 percent of the Indonesian
population is Muslim. On 2002 population estimates, this would
mean about 185 million Muslims, by far the largest of any nation in
the world. However, there are several grounds for regarding these
figures with caution. As an effect of the communist coup in 1965, all
Indonesian citizens must profess adherence to one of five officially
recognized religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism
and Buddhism. This is to ensure no one is atheist and anticipate the
resurgence of communism in Indonesia. A significant number of
those who describe themselves as Muslim are only nominally so, or
may not be Muslim at all. Many unrecognized religious minorities
find it less troublesome to be regarded as Muslims rather than as
adherents of an official minority faith.
The description about Indonesian population becomes more
complex if one looks at the major sub-cultures within Indonesian
Islam. Historically, scholars have drawn a distinction between the
devout and less pious Muslims. The most widely used typology was
that of santri and abangan, popularized by the American
anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, in the early 1960s to describe Javanese
Islam.17 Santri were the pious Muslims, those who adhere strictly to
the tenets of the faith such as praying five times daily, fasting during
the holy month of Ramadhan, giving alms and avoiding alcohol or
gambling as well. Abangan covered a broad category of Muslims
ranging from the nominal or lax to the religiously active but
syncretistic.
The distinguishing quality of abangan was that they practiced
their faith either irregularly or in a way which deviates from ritual
prescription set out in scripture. Though aware of the basic principles
and devotions of the faith, abangan may choose not to pray or fast or
are concerned about breaking the prohibitions of Islamic law, such
as eating pork or drinking wine. The more syncretistic abangan can
have highly developed religious lives in which a variety of Hindus
and Buddhis practices are blended with Islamic ritual. Abangan do
not necessarily themselves as less pious than their santri counterparts,
16 Bahtiar Effendy, op.cit., p. 212.
17 For the detail discussion about this grouping, see Clifford Geertz, The Religion of
Java, (Chicago and London: Collier-MacMillen, 1960).
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even though this is the way they are portrayed in much of the
scholarly literature. Importantly, when considering their political
orientations, santri of the 1950s and 1960s Indonesia would usually
vote for Islamic parties and endorse explicitly Islamic agendas,
whereas abangan supported nationalist, socialist and communist
parties and opposed concepts such as an Islamic state. One historical
indicator of the size of the santri community was Indonesia’s first
general election in 1955, at which the total vote for Islamic parties
was 16.6 million or 43.9 per cent of votes cast.18
However, scholars of Indonesian Islam increasingly have
debated the dichotomy of santri and abangan.19 It is commonly
accepted that the proportion of santri Muslims, particularly in urban
areas, has increased markedly since the late 1970s. This process, often
referred to as santri-isation is evident in the increasing prevalence of
Islamic attire such as headdress and flowing gowns for women, the
greater number of Muslims praying at mosques and taking
pilgrimage to Mecca, the growth in Islamic publishing, and the
proliferation of programs with Islamic themes on television and radio.
The result is that far greater numbers of Muslim appear devout in
their practice of the faith and Islamic symbols and idioms now feature
more prominently in social and political discourse than ever before.
At the same time, the number of abangan has fallen sharply, leading
some observers to question whether the category is any longer valid.20
Within santri Islam itself, two major sub-variants exist:
traditionalist and modernist (or reformist)21, which almost likely
cannot be reconciled.22 Doctrinally, traditionalists are to be
distinguished from modernists largely by their strict adherence to
one of the four main Sunni law schools (mazhab) –almost invariably
the Shafi’i school- and also by their more eclectic approach to non-
Islamic religious and cultural practices. Traditionalist ulama claim to
18 Bahtiar Effendy, op.cit., p. 203.
19 Another categorization of Indonesian Muslims that to some extent revises Geertz’
thesis is the one by Mark R. Woodword in his Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism
in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1989).
20 Bahtiar Effency, op.cit., p. 2.
21 The term “modernism” is commonly used in the literature on Indonesian Islam to
mean both “reformism” –that is, the movement to internally reform Islam as a faith by,
among others, purging it of impure practices- and “modernism” –the process of making
Islam relevant to the modern world.
22 Bahtiar Effendy, op.cit., p. 203.
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be sensitive to the rich local tradition of religious life and are inclined
to tolerate or adopt non-Islamic practices that are not specifically
prohibited by Islamic law. Modernists tend to base their Islamic law
and ritual on the Qur’an and the Sunna and reject non-Islamic
religious and cultural practices. They do not adhere solely to any law
school but allow selective adoption or rejection of mazhab teachings.
In addition there is often a socio-economic and demographic divide
between traditionalists and modernists. Traditionalists predominate
in rural areas, tend to be poorer and less educated, with many
working as farmers, laborers or small traders; modernists are
concentrated in urban areas, are better educated and more likely to
be professionals, public servants or well-to-do private entrepreneurs.
The main traditionalist organization is Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
or Revival of the Islamic Scholars. Established in 1926, NU now
claims a membership of over 35 million, based predominantly in
East and Central Java. As its name implies, ulama play a central role
in the organization. Prominent ulama, who are usually heads of large
Islamic boarding schools or pesantren (place of santri), command
reverence and loyalty from their santri followers and have extensive
decision-making power within NU at both the national and regional
levels. The largest modernist organization is Muhammadiyah, which
claims a membership of 25 million. Founded in 1912, Muhammad-
iyah’s membership is more widely distributed than that of NU, with
a strong branch structure in outer islands such as Sumatera,
Kalimantan and Sulawesi as well as across the towns and cities of
Java. Muhammadiyah has a Majelis Tarjih comprising experts in
Islamic law, whose function is to issue fatwa, providing guidance to
members on shari’a-related matters. In general, however, ulama are
less dominant than in the NU, and professionals, academics and public
servants have traditionally been prominent in the organization’s
leadership.23
In the past, there were several elements underlying this
contrasting political behavior of traditionalists and modernists. To
begin with, both parties tended to see themselves as direct
competititors for a similar santri constituency and both competed
for control of the Department of Religious Affairs with its lucrative
23 The standard book on various Islamic movements in Indonesia is still Deliar
Noor’s The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942, (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 1978).
Zaenal Muttaqin368
Jurnal TSAQAFAH
patronage opportunities and capacity to influence grassroots Islamic
activities.24 Religious affairs were especially critical to NU as it is the
only section of the bureaucracy accessible to ulama and party cadre
with a traditional Islamic education. Modernists tended to have state
or modern Islamic educational backgrounds and thus were better
able to compete for positions across the public service. Accordingly,
modernists had a technocratic and economically rationalist approach.
Problems were analyzed and solutions were formulated with only
limited reference to public opinion; professional expertise and
“rationality” were seen as the key ingredients to solving problems.
Traditionalists were more popular in orientation. They saw themselves
representing the interests and values of ordinary Muslims and
believed that the community had the spirit and instincts needed to
solve the nation’s problems. Policies that caused suffering among
grassroots communities were resisted, regardless of their “technical”
merit.
In the field of politics, traditionalists tended to adopt a more
pragmatic and accommodative approach to politics than did
modernists. NU used politics as a means of securing or protecting
its sectional interests, particularly insofar as access to government
patronage and the religious bureaucracy were concerned. In pursuing
these interests, flexibility, moderation and a capacity for compromise
became defining features of NU’s behavior. Traditionalist ulama drew
on classical Sunni principles of political quietism in support of this
approach, often citing jurisprudential maxims such as: “avoiding
danger takes precedence over seeking benefit” (in Arabic: dar’u al-
mafa >sid muqaddam ‘ala > jalb al-mas }ali >h). Underlying this was a view
that upholding the authority of (traditionalist) ulama and the schools
of law as well as ensuring order and piety in the umma were
paramount.25 The modernists by contrast emphasized resoluteness
and consistency in their approach to politics. They were reluctant to
compromise on core matters of policy and frequently quoted passages
from the Qur’an and h }adits enjoining steadfastness and commitment
to what is deemed right. In practical, these differences inclined NU
party, the largest vehicle of traditionalists, and Masyumi, regarded
24 Bahtiar Effendy, op. cit., p. 203.
25 Donald J. Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, (London and New
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), p. 41.
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as modernist Muslim party,26 towards alliances with non-Islamic
parties rather than with each other. NU was drawn to the Indonesian
Nationalist party (PNI/Partai Nasional Indonesia), with its populist,
Java-centric orientation; Masyumi founded cooperation with the
technocratic Socialist Party (PSI/Partai Sosialis Indonesia) and outer
islands-based Christian parties more congenial. 27
A Challenge to Secularism: Indonesian Context
Based on the historical facts above, then, it is wrong to say that
Indonesia is totally secular. In regard to the theory of secularization,
Indonesia is not a “secular” state. According to the theory of
secularization, a secular state is a state or country that is officially
neutral in matters of religion, neither supporting nor opposing any
particular religious beliefs or practices. A secular state also treats all
its citizens equally regardless of religion, and does not give preferential
treatment for a citizen from a particular religion over other religions.
Most often it has no state religion or equivalent. If there is a state
religion, this should have only a symbolic meaning, not affecting
the ordinary life of its citizens, and especially not making any
distinction based on someone’s religion. A secular state is defined as
protecting freedom of religion as pursued in state secularism. It is
also described to be a state that prevents religion from interfering
with state affairs, and prevents religion from controlling government
or exercising political power. Laws protect each individual including
religious minorities from discrimination on the basis of religion.
Yet, Indonesia is not a theocratic state either. Theocratic state is
a form of government in which a god or deity is recognized as the
supreme civil ruler. For believers, theocracy is a form of government
in which divine power governs an earthly human state, either in a
personal incarnation or, more often, via religious institutional
representatives (i.e.: a church), replacing or dominating civil
government. Theocratic governments enact theonomic laws.
26 Muhammadiyah never became a political party. Nonetheless, it was one of the
most important backbones of the Masyumi party. With the banning of Masyumi by President
Sukarno in 1960, and the fusion of all Islamic parties into PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/
United Development Party) by President Suharto in 1973, Muhammadiyah decided to
focus its activities on socio-religious programs.
27 Greg Fealy, op.cit., pp. 152-3.
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Theocracy should be distinguished from other secular forms of
government that have a state religion, or are merely influenced by
theological or moral concepts, and monarchies held “By the Grace
of God”. A theocracy may be monist in form, where the adminis-
trative hierarchy of the government is identical with the adminis-
trative hierarchy of the religion, or it may have two ‘arms’, but with
the state administrative hierarchy subordinate to the religious
hierarchy.
Likewise, it is also arguable that Islam is totally excluded in the
affair of Indonesian politics. For, despite the exclusion of the Jakarta
Charter, the state has nonetheless played an active role in the religious
life of the nation, and Islam in particular. This has been evident in
the existence and functions of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Since
January 1946, Indonesia has had a Ministry of Religious Affairs to
administer matters of religious law, ritual and education. The decision
to establish the ministry was in part an attempt to appease Muslim
groups aggrieved at the omission of the Jakarta Charter.28 Though
formally serving Indonesia’s six officially recognized religions, the
ministry is largely devoted to Islamic affairs. Its Islamic orientation
is evident in its logo, which depicts a Qur’an resting on a rehal (folding
book stand), and its Arabic motto: ikhlas beramal (sincere
commitment to service). The ministry is currently responsible for
over 40,000 Islamic educational institutions, administers marriage
law for Muslims, oversees the organization of pilgrimages to Mecca,
and manages ritual issues such as the timing of Ramadhan fasting,
‘Eid al-Fitr and ‘Eid al-Adh and other major celebrations in the
Muslim calendar. 29
A major element of its educational program is administering
the network of State Islamic Institutes (IAIN/Institut Agama Islam
Negeri). First established in 1960, there are now fourteen IAINs spread
all over Indonesia, offering undergraduate and graduate studies in a
range of Islamic-related sciences. There is no equivalent state-run
institution for any other four official religions: Protestant, Catholic,
Hinduism and Buddhism. Some of these IAINs have currently
transformed into State Islamic University (UIN/Universitas Islam
28 This department initially was called the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, but eventually
the government chose to a multi-religious function. B.J. Bolland, The Struggle of Islam in
Modern Indonesia, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 105-12.
29 Ibid.
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Negeri), offering not only related-Islamic sciences, but also ‘secular’
sciences such as communication, psychology, sociology, political
sciences, technology and health sciences. The department’s authority
in matters of marriage and family law also had an impact on the
personal lives on Muslims. Department officials register marriages
and disputes over marriages, divorces, inheritance and religious
bequests (waqf) involving Muslims can be brought before religious
courts.30
The New Order’s own stance towards Islam also began to
change from the late 1980s. A series of legislative and institutional
concessions to Islamic sentiment provided tangible evidence of this.
Prominent among them were the passing of education law that
obliges religious education in public and private schools as well in
1988, the expansion of the authority of religious courts in 1989, the
establishment of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association
(ICMI/Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia) in 1990, lifting of a ban
on female state school students wearing headdress (jilbab) in 1991,
the compilation of Islamic law in 1991, the upgrading of government
involvement in alms collection and distribution in 1991, the founding
of an Islamic bank (BMI/Bank Muamalat Indonesia) in 1992, and the
abolition of the state lottery (SDSB/Sumbangan Dana Sosial
Berhadiah) in 1993.31 ICMI proved especially significant. Led by
Soeharto’s favorite and then Minister for Research and Technology,
B.J. Habibie32, a German-trained of aeronautics, ICMI became a major
vehicle for patronage and rapid career advancement for senior
Muslim bureaucrats, intellectuals and professionals. In contrast to
the preceding two decades, Soeharto now appeared set on pursuing
a proportionality policy whereby the number of Muslims in cabinet
and senior military and bureaucratic positions would roughly reflect
the percentage of Muslims in society.33
30 Ibid.
31 Bahtiar Effendy, op.cit., p. 196.
32 Habibie served in this ministry from 1978-1998. In 1998, he was appointed as the
vice president to Suharto’s administration. However, he only served for two months. As
Suharto was forced by people power to resign from his 32-year presidency in the 1998
reformation movement, Habibie became the third president of Indonesia.
33 Proportionality has become one of major issues among Muslims in Indonesia’s
politics.  The New Order regime that came to power in 1966 proved antagonistic towards
Islam as a political force. Former President Soeharto was strongly abangan and innately
suspicious of santri, as well as many key figures in the regime. Few santri enjoyed high
office, while Christians and abangan commanded disproportionate influence within
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Indonesia then is formally described as a state based on religion.
The first principle of Pancasila, the five principles constitute national
ideology, enshrines “Belief in One God” (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa).
This first principle is said to be the basis of four other principles.34
The first principle in effect was a compromise among the founding
fathers between those who wanted a secular state and those who
favored an Islamic state. While there is no official state religion or
formal acknowledgement of the authority of religious law in the
Constitution, the use of the term “One God”, however, implies mono-
theism, which is considered as a concession to Muslim sentiment. 35
From this point of view, Islam in Indonesian context seems to
be in accordance with Jose Casanova’s research written in his Public
Religion in the Modern World. His main argument is that, in the past
three decades, the supposedly inevitability of progressive
secularization, which would lead to a steady decline in the social
importance of religion, has been challenged and roundly criticized
on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The proponent of the
theory of secularization commonly believe that in the modern world,
which is characterized by industrialized, highly educated,
professionally specialized, and technologically advanced societies,
religion will inevitably decline. The word secularization denotes, in
its broad and general sense, a decline in the importance of religion
both on the level of institutions and on the level of individual
consciousness. Not only are sectors of society and culture such as
arts, philosophy, literature, and science removed from religious
domination, but secularization also affects human consciousness,
government. Many of government policies were produced by CSIS (Center for Strategic
International Studies), a think-tank group of largely Chinese-Catholic intellectuals established
by Amir Moertopo, the close adviser of President Soeharto and his main strategist.
34 Pancasila, literally means five principles, is the ideology of Indonesian state. It
consists of Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa (Belief in One God), Kemanusiaan yang Adil dan
Beradab (Just and Civilized Humanity), Persatuan Indonesia (The Unity of Indonesia),
Kerakyatan yang Dipimpin oleh HikmatKebijaksanaan dalam Permusyawaratan/Perwakilan
(Democracy Guided by the Inner Wisdom in the Unanimity Arising Out of Deliberations
among Representatives), Keadilan Sosial bagi Seluruh Rakyat Indonesia (Social Justice for
the Whole People of Indonesia).
35 In term of religious study, there is always a question about Buddhism, which is
one of the religions acknowledged by the state, since Buddhism does not have any concept
of personal God as other religions. Hinduism, although mostly regarded as polytheist
religion, however, still has the Almighty God in Brahma.
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which in turn influences more individuals to retreat from religion.36
Secularization is usually related to other results of Enlighten-
ment such as development, modernization, rationalization, and
progress, which each has its origin in the European historical
experience. In this historical context, Jose Casanova describes that
secularization refers to:
…the massive expropriation and appropriation, usually by the state,
of monasteries, landholdings, and the mortmain wealth of the
church… Thus, it has become customary to designate as seculariza-
tion the appropriation, whether forcibly or by default, by secular
institutions of functions that traditionally had been in the hands of
ecclesiastical institutions.37
This results in a newly differentiated system in which religious
institutions see their influence over other spheres in the social
structure diminish. The world as a whole is now constituted as a
secular world in which religion had to find its own distinct space.38
The decline of religious beliefs and practices, thus, is seen as a
necessary and inevitable consequence of the secularization process.
Furthermore, religion would not be able to survive the challenges
posed by modern science and would inevitably loose its social
relevance or even vanish entirely, resulting in a beneficial privatization
and decline of religious beliefs and practices. While progressive
secularization is seen as central to modernity, progress, and
emancipation, religious belief and practice are confidently predicted
to become obsolete.
Instead of fading away and disappearing in the modern world,
however, many areas of the world have witnessed strong movements
of religious revival. The recognition of religion’s continuing vitality
around the world has disrupted the consensus about the universality
and certainty of the secularization process and eventually prompted
Peter L. Berger, who was once a champion of secularization, to correct
convictions written in his earlier works. As a result, Berger states in a
recent publication examining the turnaround in the debate over
36 Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy; Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion,
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 107.
37 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1994), p. 13
38 Ibid., p. 15.
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secularization, that is “a whole body of literature by historians and
social scientists loosely labeled ‘secularization theory’ is essentially
mistaken”.39
The awareness of the renewed assertiveness and growing public
and political relevance of many religious movements throughout
the decades of the 1970s and 1980s induces the acknowledgement
of inconsistencies in the secularization theory for describing social
reality and the need to re-evaluate its claims. Based on actual examples
of the role and influence of religion in several regions, among others,
the 1979 Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions, the visit of the Polish
Pope to Poland and Salman Rushdie’s affair, 40 Jose Casanova describes
these instances in which religion abandoned its allocated space in
the private realm of modern societies and asserted itself in the public
sphere in political and moral debates as “the deprivatization of
religion”.41
Berger himself acknowledges that modernity does not actually
succeed in secularizing the world. The assumption that moderniza-
tion leads to the decline role of religion in human enterprise, thus, is
not totally correct. Modernization, however, did bring about
secularization that has effects in some places, yet contra-secularization
movements also occur in other places. Modernity reduces the role
of religious institutions and thoughts, yet it also provokes the
emergence of other institutions strengthening religions.42
Yet, unlike Casanova’s argument, Islam is never privatized in
the context of Indonesian politics. Casanova’s argument, to my
understanding, emphasizes the resurgence of religions, religious
institution, and religiously motivated movements toward a secular
or secularized state. Indonesia is never totally a secular or secularized
39 Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview”, in The
Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, edited by Peter L. Berger,
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Ethics and Public Policy Center and Eerdmans, 1999), p. 2.
40 Jose Casanova, op.cit., pp. 3-4
41 Ibid., p. 5.
42 Peter L. Berger, “Desecularization…, p. 3. There are several others scholars
who criticize the “old” theory of secularization, among others: R. Stephen Warner, Rodney
Stark and Roger Finke. On Warner, see R. Stephen Warner, “Work in Progress Toward a
New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion.” American Journal of Sociology 98
(1993) and “More Progress on the New Paradigm.” In Ted G. Jelen (ed.), Sacred Markets,
Sacred Canopies, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002). About Stark and Finke, see
Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000).
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state, neither is it an Islamic state as well. The efforts to make it a
secular or Islamic state have always been unpopular and challenged
by adherents of both parties. However, even though Indonesia never
chooses the state’s religion, religions in Indonesia, especially Islam,
play important role in the state’s affair and, to some extent, in
determining public policies.
Conclusion
It seems fair to conclude that the relationship between Islam
and the state in Indonesia goes beyond the dichotomous old paradigm
between the strict separation of religion and the state and the religion-
based state. Another falsely dichotomous question whether Islam is
compatible with political development does not also work in
Indonesian context. Indonesia is not a secular state, not is it theocratic
state. Indonesia, although predominated by Muslim population that
is even the largest among Muslim countries, is not an Islam-based
state either. Yet, from the beginning of the formation of Indonesia,
Islam is eventually regarded as, in Sukarno’s words, “flame” or “spirit”
of the state. To accommodate Islamic sentiment to apply the shari’a,
the state established the Department of Religious Affairs. Although
this department includes all five major and official religions in
Indonesia, most of its works deal with the matters of Islam and
Muslims in Indonesia. The establishment of this department makes
somewhat difficult to determine whether Indonesia is a religious or
secular state.
However, it is clear that the secularization theory does not apply
in Indonesian context. Echoing Warner, it only applies in Europe. To
some extent, Islam in Indonesia follows Casanova’s deprivatization
of religion, even though Islam is never totally privatized.
Furthermore, the question on Islam and state in Indonesia is, thus,
how much and what kinds of Islam (in the interpretive sense) are
compatible with or necessary for political development.), or what
kinds of Islamic political ideas and practices are capable of building
a better relationship with the nation state in Indonesia. Having said
this, the uncomfortable political relationship between Islam and the
nation state does not stem from the doctrines of Islam per se. Rather,
it derives from the way Islam is articulated socio-culturally,
economically, and politically in Indonesia. The legalistic or formalistic
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conception of Islam, because of its exclusive tendency, is likely to
breed tensions in a socio-religiously and culturally heterogeneous
society. On the other hand, what might be called a substantial
conception –that is, one that favors justice, equality, participation,
and consultation- of Islam can lay the necessary groundwork for
establishing a viable synthesis between Islam and the state to reshape
the terms of their political relationship.[]
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